Firms' Political Connections and Pays Policies to Board of Directors

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor of Accounting, University of Tehran

2 University of Tehran

Abstract

  The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate political connections on the compensation policies of board of directors. The sample of this research includes 207 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the years 2008 to 2019. Also, multivariate regression models with Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method have been used to test the research hypothesis in a panel data set. The results showed that the political connections of the companies have a significant and negative effect on the level of pay of the board of directors, but have no significant effect on the performance-payment relationship of the board of directors. It was also found that corporate political connections significantly reduce the payment gap between the board of directors and employees.
1- Introduction
In developing countries like Iran, political figures have a large presence in the capital market. According to existing literature, political connections can affect the corporate policies of business units. The purpose of the present research is to investigate the effect of corporate political connections on the payment policies to the board of directors from the three dimensions of the amount paid to the board of directors, the effect on the relationship between the performance and the payment of the board and the dispersion of payments in the organization. In order to explain the effect, four theories in the literature of accounting and payment policies in the organization have been used including theories of social comparison, government governance, political costs and agency. The theory of social comparison states that the presence of political figures in companies will be accompanied by safeguarding of social values and conventions, and in this regard the political companies will reduce the level of payment to the board, weakening the relation between performance and payment, and reducing the payment dispersion in the organization. Based on the theory of government governance, the goal of political figures is to fill the pillars of corporate governance with the goals of government governance, by increasing the payment to the board, weakening the relationship between performance and payment to the board, and increasing the pay dispersion in the organization. Based on the theory of political costs it has been stated that political firms have the potential opportunity to make more unusual payments to the board, because they are supported by government political power. Hence, it is expected that unusual payment to the board, strong relationship between firm performance and the board payment and much payment dispersion will be more likely in the organization. Finally, the agency theory states that the presence of political figures in the company is accompanied by a reduction of unconventional payments to the board of directors, the strengthening of the relationship between the firm performance and the payment of the board of directors, and the increase in payment dispersion in the company.
  2- Hypothesis
Due to the existence of competing theories, the influence of corporate political connections on the payment policies to the board is studied by three without direction hypothesis as follows:
H1: The political connections of companies have a significant effect on the level of payment of the board.
H2: The political connections of companies have a significant effect on the relationship between firm performance and board payment.
H3: The political connections of companies have a significant effect on the dispersion of payments of the board of directors and employees.
  3- Methods
The statistical population of the present study is all companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2019. In order to select the companies under study, such criteria as admission to Tehran Stock Exchange, lack of presence in the financial and investment industries, the end of the fiscal year ending to March and the availability of information have been considered. Accordingly, 207 companies were selected as study samples. Data needed for research is collected from information banks affiliated with Tehran Stock Exchange and official website of the companies. The research hypothesis has been tested by multivariate regression model with Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method on a panel data set. In order to analyze the data, Excel, EViews and Stata software have been used.
  4- Results
The first hypothesis of the research was confirmed at a significant level of 5%. In other words, the political connections of the companies have a negative and significant effect on the amount paid to the board.
The second hypothesis of the research was not approved at any level of statistical significance. In other words, based on the empirical evidence, it cannot be verified that political connections have a significant impact on the relationship between the performance and payment of the board of directors.
The third hypothesis of the research was confirmed at a significant level of five percent. In other words, the political connections of the companies have a positive and significant effect on the compression of payment in the company.
  5- Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the first hypothesis test showed that the political connections of the companies had a negative and significant effect on the board's payment. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of social comparison. In other words, the presence of political connections in Tehran Stock Exchange companies will be significantly related to controlling the level of payment to the board of directors. In contrast, in private companies due to the lack of supervision of political figures, they provide higher levels of payment to their board of directors.
Also, by testing the second hypothesis of the research, it was found that the political connections of the companies did not have a significant effect on the relationship between the firm's performance and the payment of the board. In this regard it can be stated that in compliance with the prediction of agency theory, management's compensation in TSE's companies has strong connection with performance as the presence of political figures cannot create any significant effect on the circumstance.
By examining the third hypothesis of the research, it was observed that the political relationships of the companies have a positive and significant effect on the compression of the board and staff pay. As a result, based on the forecast of social comparison theory, it can be argued that the presence of political figures increases the equality of payment in the firm so that they can meet the social values of Iranian people.

 


 
 

Keywords


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