the impact of the aggressive reporting approach on the relationship between managers' competence and audit fees

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Prof. in accounting, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Lorestan University , Iran

2 assistant prof. in accounting, Jahrom University

3 MSc. in accounting, Faculty of Management and Economic, Lorestan University, Iran

Abstract

Competent managers can strategically alter financial operations to achieve organizational or personal goals. This study investigates the impact of aggressive reporting approach on the relationship between manager competence and audit fees. Data from 102 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2023 were analyzed using a panel data regression approach. According to the findings, manager competence leads to an increase in audit fees among the studied companies. In other words, auditors increase audit fees to mitigate audit risk. Manager competence is an important source of internal motivation and indicates that competent managers are more inclined to implement high-risk projects, increasing audit effort.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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